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Ho w we ll d o  p o litic ians re p re se nt the  p re fe re nce s o f the ir co nstitue nts?
By ‘bridging’ political surveys, we can measure levels of
representation in American politics.
Democracy only functions if elected officials represent the wishes of their constituents. But in a
country with hundreds of millions of voters, and thousands of legislators, how can we measure
how the policy preferences of constituents affect the actions of their representatives? Chris
Tausanovitch argues that by aggregating and ‘bridging’ differing surveys, we can estimate
liberal-conservative scores for voters, and legislative responsiveness for states, congressional
districts, state legislative districts, and even cities.
One of  the oldest and most important questions in polit ical science is the question of  how
well legislators and other elected of f icials represent their constituents, and more broadly, how exactly the
policy pref erences of  constituents af f ect the actions of  representatives. Ask any wonk, polit ico, or casual
f ollower of  polit ics and they are likely to have an opinion about this question. So did many great polit ical
philosophers throughout history: Hobbes, Locke, Mill, Rousseau, Burke, and many others. Although almost
everyone agrees that polit icians do not (and most would say, cannot) adhere perf ectly to the pref erences
of  the people they represent, there is wide disagreement about the degree to which legislators are
responsive and the type of  polit ical institutions that could f oster better responsiveness.
Resolving these dif f erences empirically is not easy. Some scholars have attempted to gauge
responsiveness by asking legislators to evaluate themselves. Others have tried to deduce the degree and
kind of  responsiveness by f ollowing legislators closely and trying to see whether their actions seem to be
motivated by the desires of  their constituents. However, the most straightf orward way to answer this
question is to measure the policy pref erences of  voters—what they want their representatives to do—and
to compare them to the policy actions of  those representatives. This is easier said than done, but modern
polit ical science methods provide a path f orward.
Thanks to outlets such as the
polit ical science blog the
Monkey Cage, and general
audience blogs like the
Huf f ington Post, Pollster.com,
and Nate Silver ’s
f ivethirtyeight.com, many
people are now f amiliar with
the budding science of  election
f orecasting. What many may
not know is that statistical
tools can be used to do more
than give us up-to-the-minute
“best guesses” about the
outcomes of  elections. They
can also help us answer
important questions about
democracy. In the case of  representation, we can aggregate surveys in order to measure the policy
pref erences of  constituents, aggregate votes to measure the policy stances of  legislators and other
elected of f icials, and use modern statistical techniques to summarize and compare the two. But to do so,
we need some tricks to overcome a f ew challenges.
The f irst challenge is that we need a way to summarize and measure polit ical posit ions. Voters have a
myriad of  opinions and views on all sorts of  policy issues, and so do legislators. Comparing every single
one would not be f easible, and it would be hard to understand or explain the result. Luckily, polit ical views
tend to have a common and relatively simple structure in the United States. For most of  the policy
questions we ask in surveys, we can identif y one response that we would think of  as being more
“conservative” and one that we would think of  as being more “liberal.” That’s because these labels
represent sets of  issues that stem f rom similar values that are shared by wide swaths of  the public.
“Conservatives” tend to believe in f ree enterprise, limited government, and tradit ional values, whereas
“liberals” tend to place more emphasis on equality, government solutions to national problems, and secular
values. We can use this f act to aggregate answers to policy questions and give each voter or elected
of f icial an overall policy “score” based on how liberal or conservative their responses to many dif f erent
kinds of  questions are.
The second challenge is that national survey samples aren’t nearly big enough to measure the pref erences
of  constituents in every district. We need minimum samples of  a f ew hundred people in order to say
anything about a particular population, whether it be the country as a whole, a particular state, or a
congressional district. There are 435 congressional districts in the United States, so even if  we only
wanted sample sizes of  300 people in each congressional district, that would require a survey of  130,500
people. What if  we wanted to examine the pref erences of  constituents in state legislatures rather than
Congress? It would take a national survey of  over 600,000 people to achieve a suf f icient sample size in
every state senate district. Unf ortunately, no single polit ical survey has a sample size that large. In order to
get sample sizes that big, we need to combine respondents to a lot of  dif f erent surveys. Here, however, we
run into another problem. Dif f erent surveys ask dif f erent questions, so how should we compare the
liberalism and conservatism of  people who answer these entirely dif f erent surveys?
MIT Prof essor Chris Warshaw and I have solved this second problem using a simple trick, which some have
dubbed “bridging”. In order to compare respondents f rom surveys that ask dif f erent questions, we run our
own survey that asks all of  the questions f rom all of  the other surveys to a completely new set of
respondents. This new survey doesn’t require a large sample: a national survey of  1,000 will do. We use
this survey to establish the relationships between responses to dif f erent sorts of  questions. This survey
creates a “bridge” between all of  the other surveys we want to use. For instance, say that one survey asks
respondents whether they support an increase in the minimum wage and another survey asks whether the
government should provide everyone with health care. How of ten is someone who opposes raising the
minimum wage more conservative than someone who supports government-provided healthcare? By
answering questions like this, we can establish a common liberal-conservative score f or many dif f erent
surveys. In our article, we achieved a sample size of  275,000, allowing us to estimate liberal-conservative
scores f or states, congressional districts, state legislative districts, and even cit ies. All of  these dif f erent
levels of  government present opportunit ies to learn more about legislative responsiveness and how
dif f erent institutions might af f ect it. In the f uture, sample sizes of  300 to 500,000 will allow us to learn even
more.
So to what degree do elected of f icials represent their constituents? There are many subtleties to
comparing the posit ions of  representatives and constituents that go beyond the scope of  this short blog
post. What we can say is that at all levels of  government, more liberal constituencies are likely to have more
liberal representatives, and more conservative constituencies are more likely to have more conservative
representatives.
Figure 1: Average liberal-conservative score for US cit ies and the percent of city revenue from
sales taxes
For example, Figure 1 above shows the average liberal-conservative score f or cit ies in the United States,
and the percent of  the revenue that each of  these cit ies gets f rom sales taxes. Each point on the graph is
a dif f erent city. We might think that cit ies are a particularly tough case f or representation because
Americans of ten know very litt le about how their cit ies and towns are governed. Turnout is abysmally low,
of ten in the 10-20 per cent range. Here we are f ocusing on a single policy that is related to the regressivity
of  the tax system—that is, how much of  the tax burden of  the city f alls on the poor. Poorer individuals
spend most of  their income, so they pay more taxes when sales taxes are the main source of  city revenue
than when property taxes or income taxes are the main source of  revenue. Conservatives tend to f avor
more regressive taxes over revenue sources that tax the rich more highly. What this graph shows is that
more conservative cit ies (the ones on the right) do indeed get a much higher share of  their income f rom
sales taxes, and more liberal cit ies (the ones on the lef t) get much less of  their income f rom sales taxes.
Although there are a f ew liberal cit ies that get high shares of  income f rom sales taxes, and a f ew
conservative cit ies that get low shares f rom sales taxes, the trend on average is what we would expect if
democracy were working. Deviations f rom the trend may have perf ectly reasonable explanations. For
instance, some states do not allow cit ies to levy income taxes, and others put limits on property taxes.
There are many dif f erent sorts of  hypothesis that we can test about representation, and indeed, perhaps
many types of  representation. What we have done, is to develop some techniques to take the very f irst
step of  measuring some of  the basic quantit ies of  interest: the pref erences of  legislators and
constituents. We have made these estimates available at our website, so other scholars can make use of
them.
In our era of  polarized polit ics, cynicism about the polit ical process in America is widespread. Much of  this
cynicism is probably merited. However, this does not mean that polit icians are f ree agents, acting
completely outside the mandate of  those who elected them. By bringing data to the question of
representation, I hope that we can better understand when and why polit icians deviate f rom their
constituents’ wishes.
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